We describe a previously unreported hazard resulting from compression of an electrical cable by an operating theatre table. This resulted in a live wire contact to the operating table. Intermittent connection of the table to earth during a procedure resulted in triggering of a residual current device mitigating the effects of the hazard. The actual cause was not readily identified as the devices connecting the table to earth were considered most likely to be the source of the current. There was potential for significant injury to the patient and theatre staff which would have been diminished if staff had had a better understanding of the electrical safety equipment in use. We examine the underlying causes of the accident, discuss electrical safety and correct use of safety devices in the operating theatre, and propose guidelines for appropriate management.
CASE HISTORy
A previously well 75-year-old �emale was anaesthetized �or laparoscopic cholecystectomy. With standard monitoring in place, anaesthesia was induced with �entanyl and propo�ol and endotracheal intubation �acilitated with vecuronium. Anaesthesia was maintained with a target-controlled in�usion o� propo�ol via a Graseby 3500 syringe pump (Graseby Medical ltd, Wat�ord, united Kingdom), inhaled nitrous oxide and intermittent intravenous bolus doses o� morphine. Ventilation was assisted with an Ohmeda Excel 210SE with integrated Ohmeda 7900 ventilator (Datex-Ohmeda Inc., Colorado, u.S.A.). One hour a�ter induction o� anaesthesia, there was a complete loss o� electrical power to the anaesthetic machine and monitors. Anaesthesia and surgery had been unevent�ul to this point.
The loss o� electrical power resulted in �ailure o� both the ventilator and monitors. The propo�ol in�usion continued una��ected. The patient was manually ventilated and monitored by observation and carotid pulse palpation while portable monitoring was being sourced. It was soon noticed that the residual current device (RCD) located on a roo�-mounted beam above the anaesthetic machine had been triggered. The RCD covered a panel o� �our electrical outlets which supplied the anaesthetic machine and monitors, a convective air warming blanket (Warm Touch, Mallinkrodt Medical, Guarez, Mexico) an intravenous �luid warmer (Biggler BW 385, Mauerbach, Austria), and a lower limb sequential compression device (Tyco SCD Response, Tyco Healthcare, Mans�ield, u.S.A.) ( Figure 1 ). Initial inspection o� these devices, their associated cables and connections did not demonstrate any obvious problem. It was noted that the power loss was associated with the positioning o� an image intensi�ier (Phillips libra 9800 Series, utah, u.S.A.) to �acilitate an intraoperative cholangiogram. In addition, the surgeon suggested that there may have been a �lash at the le�t side o� the base o� the operating table at the time the arm o� the image intensi�ier was positioned beneath the patient. The image intensi�ier was removed and the hospital electrician was noti�ied.
The switch on the RCD was re-set and, as all equipment �unctioned normally, the operation was resumed. A�ter 15 minutes a �urther bright �lash was observed at the upper le�t corner o� the base o� the operating table by both anaesthetist and surgeon. The RCD was again triggered and power lost to the same equipment. The �lash occurred adjacent to the diathermy �oot pedal. The diathermy �oot pedal and the lower arm o� the image intensi�ier had both been in close proximity to the site o� the �irst �lash. The entire diathermy system (Valleylab Force 40 ESu, Colorado, u.S.A.) was removed and replaced. The hospital electrician had still not arrived.
The RCD was again re-set, the operation completed and recovery �rom anaesthesia achieved without �urther incident. A�ter the patient was trans�erred �rom the operating table to her bed, there was a third triggering o� the RCD with a �lash as a member o� sta�� kicked the replacement diathermy pedal against the table.
When the drapes were removed, it was noticed that the electrical cord to the sequential compression device had been compressed between the outer column o� the operating table and its base at the corner opposite to where the �lash had occurred ( Figure 2 ). The compression, which had most likely occurred during patient positioning at the beginning o� surgery, had stripped the electrical insulation and exposed the bare wires to the operating table.
The patient was closely observed in a moni-tored bed �or 24 hours and made an unevent�ul recovery.
DISCuSSION
In the operating theatre, protection �rom electrical hazards must be provided in line with appropriate standards. All operating environments are required to con�orm to minimum body protected standards as various conditions exist that lower the usual protective resistance provided by dry skin (e.g. metal instruments, electrode pastes, conductive �luids). Australian and New �ealand Standards (AS/N�S) require that cardiac and body protected areas incorporate either a) residual current devices or b) an isolation trans�ormer and line isolation monitor. For cardiac protected areas, both systems also require connection to a common earth (equipotential earthing) �or any conductive object directly or indirectly in contact with the patient (AS/N�S 2500) 1 . This is to protect against microshock (ventricular �ibrillation (VF) induced by small currents �lowing via lowresistance pathways directly to the heart, �or example temporary pacing wires, pulmonary artery catheter �illed with saline) although it is debatable whether this remains essential with improved equipment in current use 2 . As this patient was undergoing a body-type procedure, the operating table was not connected to an equipotential earth.
Residual current devices (also known as ground �ault circuit interrupters, earth leakage core-balance devices, sa�ety switches [1] [2] [3] [4] ) are to the electrical in-are to the electrical industry what seat belts are to the motor industry. RCDs are sa�ety devices that rapidly disrupt an electrical sa�ety devices that rapidly disrupt an electrical circuit when current is detected leaking to earth. RCDs monitor the electric current �lowing along a circuit and continuously compare the current �low in both the active (supply) and neutral (return) conductors. unbalanced current �low implies that some o� the current in the active conductor is not returning through the neutral conductor and is there�ore leaking to earth 2, 5 . I� an RCD senses any loss o� current, where electricity is diverting to the earth rather than through the circuit, it will very quickly cut the power. Worksa�e Australia (1992) determined that over hal� o� workplace deaths due to electricity (excluding those due to overhead power lines) could have been prevented by the use o� RCDs, and advised they be used in all homes and workplaces 5 
. The Australian
The Australian Standard Wiring Rules (AS/N�S3000) require RCD protection o� socket outlets in all domestic, residential, commercial and industrial installations. Previously RCD protection was a requirement in domestic electrical installations only 6 .
It must be emphasised that RCDs are not synonymous with �uses or circuit breakers. The latter circuit breakers. The latter devices disrupt the circuit only in response to an electrical overload or short circuit in order to protect in order to protect equipment �rom current overload. I� the resistance � the resistance in the earth �ault current path is too high, restricting current to a �low inadequate to trip a circuit breaker or blow a �use, electricity can continue to �low to earth �or an extended time 5 . These devices are designed to protect equipment, not to prevent electrocution. electrocution. They disrupt the circuit relatively slowly and require signi�icant current (amps rather than milliamps) 3, 5, 7 .
RCDs operate within 10-50 milliseconds, in response to very low leakage currents (e.g. 10 to 30 milliamps) 5, 7 . This is important, as currents greater currents greater than 100 milliamps may produce VF 2, 4, 8, 9 . Even lower currents may lead to death by other means, e.g. asphyxiation �rom respiratory muscle contraction 3, 10 . The time �actor is important as very brie� exposure is not likely to induce VF, since current must �low during the �irst part o� the electrocardiogram T wave. When this does occur, an extrasystole is the likely outcome. I� current continues over several cardiac cycles, VF is likely to arise 10 .
RCDs can be arranged to protect a number o� circuits, several socket outlets on a circuit or even the entire electrical installation with a single RCD. The number o� circuits or socket outlets connected to one RCD is in�luenced by the likelihood and impact o� a �aulty piece o� equipment tripping several other circuits or socket outlets. The RCD does not protect against all types o� hazard. It is designed to disconnect the electrical supply when there is a leakage o� electricity to earth. In the rare event that a person is in contact with both the active and neutral wires o� an electrical supply simultaneously, the RCD would provide no protection �rom electrocution 2,5 . RCDs require regular maintenance. A push button test should be per�ormed at least three monthly and checked every two years by an electrician (AS/N�S 3760) 11 . unless occasionally triggered, an RCD may mechanically �reeze and not trip when required 2,5,7 .
The major �actors involved in this case were the poor design o� the operating table and the un�ortunate placement o� the power cord �or the sequential compression device. The operating table was a manually operated XRT 3000 (Denyers International, Moorabbin, Australia). The outer section o� the table column has a corner with a rounded lower edge, which lies �lush with the table base when at its lowest position, but 5 to 7 mm proud o� the inner column. This overlap may compress and cut the insulation o� an electrical cord stretched across this corner. Several other brands o� operating table display a similar hazard.
The evolution o� anaesthesia and surgery has resulted in more monitoring and therapeutic devices being applied to the patient during surgery. In this case, damage to the insulation o� the electrical cord supplying the sequential compression device exposed the active wire to the metal o� the operating table. As the operating table was manually operated it had no in-built earthing and was not connected to an equipotential earthing point. Modern diathermy uses an isolated internal circuit, as well as having a casing which is earthed 4, 12 . It is presumed that the �irst occasion in which the RCD disrupted the circuit was the result o� the earthed casing o� the image intensi�ier contacting the side o� the table. The resulting �lash may have been less bright due to increased resistance provided by its painted sur�ace. The second and third events were the result o� the earthed diathermy pedal being pushed against the table metalwork, �irst by the surgeon's �oot and later by another sta�� member's �oot. The equipment casing provided completion o� the circuit to earth on each occasion.
The identi�ication o� a �aulty device �rom several that are serviced by a single RCD that has been triggered is usually straight�orward. Each device should be disconnected in turn until the RCD can be re-set without �urther triggering. The source o� current leakage will then have been removed. Alternatively, each device may be disconnected and then reconnected in turn. The RCD should trigger when the �aulty device is added. In the vast majority o� circumstances, this will identi�y the problem. In the case presented here, the �act that the operating table was not earthed resulted in con�usion and delay in �aulty device identi�ication. As there was no continuous earth connection, current leakage (with detection by the RCD) did not occur until a route to earth was provided by another object. This unusual situation also allowed the RCD to be re-set with the hazard still present (i.e. the table 'live' but no current �lowing).
This was a potentially very dangerous situation �or all involved, with exposure to the risk o� �ire, burns, explosion and macroshock 4, 8 . The residual current device did provide repeated protection �rom electrocution but this device, while robust, is not �ailsa�e 2, 5, 7 . A clear �lash occurred with the possibility o� �lammable material ignition or explosion on three occasions 13 . In an ideal situation a quali�ied electrician should be consulted prior to re-setting an RCD. In the absence o� an electrician a more logical search �or the cause o� the �lash should have been made.
It should have been recognised that a device whose power supply was controlled by the triggered RCD was the source o� the problem. The simple act o� removing all non-essential items �rom the panel o� sockets supplied by the RCD would have removed the danger. Some protection may have been provided by other �actors in this case. Operating theatres historically have high resistance �looring (though not so high as to allow build-up o� static charge) 4, 9 . Similarly, the anti-static mattresses between the patient and the table, and the anti-static shoes o� the sta�� provide a degree o� resistance to current �low 9, 14, 15 .
The alternative protective system used in many theatres, isolation o� the electrical supply (with line isolation monitor), would also have provided adequate protection. This system has the advantage o� not disrupting the electrical supply in the event o� a �ault (this is highly desirable when power loss could be catastrophic, e.g. cardiac surgery) and is arguably superior to an earthed system with RCD protection. In an isolated supply, power is dispensed to large isolation trans�ormers producing an electrical supply that is insulated �rom earth. It �ollows that a single earth �ault cannot act as a route �or current �low, as a circuit cannot be completed. A �ault such as occurred in this case, in which one o� the power supply wires made contact with the operating table, would not there�ore cause an immediate hazard. Hypothetically, had this case occurred in a theatre with an isolated electrical system, the line isolation monitor would not have alarmed initially as there was no earth contact to the table. A person touching both the table and an earthed instrument would not receive an electric shock as a circuit would not be completed. Similarly, earthed equipment touching the table would not produce a spark. In either instance the line isolation monitor would alarm �or the duration o� contact, but this does not indicate that leakage current is �lowing, simply that a hazard resulting in loss o� isolation is present. This should prompt investigation and removal o� the source 2, 4, 8, 15 . It is possible that even a trained technician would have had di��iculty identi�ying the intermittent �ault �rom sporadic momentary alarms.
The line isolation monitor must never be ignored. A serious hazard could arise in the rare event o� a second �ault arising, in which the other supply wire is earthed. In this case, the table would then be at �ull mains potential relative to earth and could lead to unimpeded electrocution o� a person touching the live table and an earthed instrument, as there is no RCD to disrupt the current. Earthed equipment contacting the table would also complete the circuit and result in a substantial spark and consequent �ire hazard. 4, 8, 15 In the example presented, an isolated supply would have prevented a spark with consequent �ire hazard, and the risk o� electrocution. It could be argued that all operating theatres use isolated supplies. Isolated supplies are a more expensive option and no equipment is immune to �ailure. One case in the literature reports the inadvertent removal o� the entire isolated power system and line isolation monitors �ollowing renovation, resulting in repeated instances o� electric shocks. luckily no injury occurred but it appears that there existed a complete absence o� protective devices �or some time 16 . As with RCDs, there is no protection against the unlikely event o� a person contacting both active and return wires o� the supply 2 .
Some operating theatres are protected by RCDs (possibly only one or two per theatre) located in locked rooms or boxes only accessible by electrical sta��. This would prevent resetting the electrical supply in the event o� a potentially dangerous hazard, but the drawback is the inability to re-establish supply rapidly �or vital equipment. It is important to be aware o� the type o� system that is installed and which outlets are covered by a single RCD, so as to allow a rational approach should an electrical �ailure arise due to a �aulty piece o� equipment.
Well maintained anaesthesia equipment with battery backup would reduce both the distress �or the anaesthetist and the danger imposed on the patient in this situation, and also reduce the temptation to reconnect the mains supply prior to the arrival o� an electrician.
As more electrical devices are applied to the patient and employed during surgery, the likelihood o� an incident such as this one increases. Appropriate education and awareness o� electrical hazards by all theatre personnel is a key element in risk management.
Primary prevention o� electrical accidents includes care and protocol with regard to placement o� electrical cables. These are the most hazardous part o� any appliance 9 . Pendant electrical supply should be used as much as possible and extension cable use minimized. When not in use, longer cables should be coiled, without sharp bends. Electrical cables must never be allowed to be run over by heavy equipment. They must be li�ted over and around other equipment. All cables must be regularly checked �or integrity and i� damaged should be repaired or replaced by a pro�essional 9, 15 . Routine and regular checking o� cord positioning should occur. Only anaesthesia related devices should be connected to anaesthetic electrical panels 17 . Equipment must be pro�essionally maintained, �aults promptly reported and damaged items repaired or replaced 5, 7, 9, 15 . Fluid spills must be minimized as many �luids in the operating room are good conductors (e.g. saline) or highly �lammable (e.g. alcohol) 15 . Risk to electrical equipment and connections should be reduced by better operating theatre and equipment design 18 .
Secondary prevention should include guidelines to be �ollowed when an RCD is triggered. Guidelines �or appropriate action when an lIM sounds �or isolated theatres can be �ound in several anaesthesia related publications 4, 8 . The authors propose the �ollowing as an approach to earthed systems with accessible RCDs. (RCDs in locked rooms obviate the need �or a more simpli�ied approach, but the same principles apply.) (1) Recognise RCD triggering as a danger sign. (2) Obtain pro�essional electrical advice as soon as possible. (3) leave the RCD in 'o��' position. (4) I� the RCD triggered immediately a�ter a new item plugged in (to a socket covered by the triggered RCD), then this item should be removed and the RCD may be re-set. (5) I� it is not obvious which item has triggered the RCD, then all items connected to that panel o� sockets should be removed-the RCD must not be re-set with any o� these in place (even the anaesthesia machine is not indispensable in most circumstances-patients could be hand ventilated until a portable ventilator is available). (6) Any items removed must be checked by appropriately quali�ied personnel prior to �uture use. (7) I� problems continue, remove nonessential sta�� and relocate to another theatre i� possible.
CONCluSION
This case shows that poor equipment design in a hazardous environment has the potential to cause signi�icant harm to the patient and the theatre sta��. The triggering o� the RCD in this case certainly reduced the risk but its repeated triggering indicated that the original problem persisted. The events were con�using as the primary cause was obscured �rom view, the �lashes occurred distant to the site o� the cord compression directing attention away �rom the problem, and the RCD could be repeatedly re-set due to lack o� a continuous earth connection. A more logical approach could have identi�ied and removed the underlying problem earlier. This was not done �or a number o� reasons, including the absence o� guidelines and training, time pressures, and the lack o� immediate pro�essional electrical advice. This is a sentinel event. The increasing application o� additional sophisticated monitoring, diagnostic, and therapeutic equipment in operating theatres in association with suboptimal equipment design will result in error and accident. Sa�ety devices such as the RCD may provide some degree o� protection but i� its �unction is not understood or appropriate action taken once it per�orms that �unction, the result may not be as benign in the �uture.
